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APPRAISING MERGER EFFICIENCIES
Herbert Hovenkamp*

INTRODUCTION
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten
to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from
reduced output. The principal statutory vehicle for addressing mergers under
the antitrust laws is Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which condemns both stock
and asset acquisitions where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”1 The statute
itself neither defines “substantially . . . lessen competition” nor provides for
an efficiency defense. As a result some courts continue to doubt whether the
defense exists at all.2 Section 7 is enforced by both the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). While private plaintiffs are also empowered to enforce
Section 7 through both damages and equity actions, their impact on merger
law has been relatively small.3
Mergers of relatively small firms in competitive markets almost never
pose the Clayton Act threats. When markets are more concentrated or products are differentiated, however, the threat of a merger resulting in higher
prices looms larger.4 At the same time, a merger that threatens a price increase may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve
*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton Business, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Steven C. Salop, Gregory J. Werden, Richard Gilbert, Erik Hovenkamp, and Richard
Brunell for helpful comments on a draft.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012):
No person . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no person . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person . . . where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
Prior to 1950, many mergers were challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and a few are even
today. Today, a few mergers are challenged under Section 1, but more are challenged under Section 7 of
the Sherman Act. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 906 (4th ed.
2016).
2 E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir.
2016) (neither Supreme Court nor Third Circuit has adopted the defense and the Supreme Court has “cast
doubt on its availability”).
3 On private merger challenges, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 356 (4th ed.
2014).
4 See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
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its product.5 Few areas of merger law are more controversial than the treatment of such efficiency claims, which are often raised but almost never found
to justify a merger that has been shown to be prima facie unlawful. The decisions that credit claimed efficiencies as justification typically also find that
the government failed to make out its prima facie case against the merger.6
Thus, in those cases acknowledgement of efficiencies is simply dicta.
Nevertheless, attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. But we tolerate most mergers
because of a background, highly generalized belief that most—or at least
many—do produce cost savings or improvements in products, services, or
distribution. Those who think that significant efficiency gains are likely to be
both present and strong in most mergers would prefer to give merging firms
the benefit of the doubt, and perhaps adjust proof burdens accordingly.7 By
contrast, those who believe that many mergers produce few or trivial efficiency gains would narrow the defense or perhaps even eliminate it.8
Acting jointly, the Antitrust Division and FTC (“Agencies”) have issued
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger Guidelines”), most recently updated
in 2010, which set out the standards for merger review.9 The Merger Guidelines address both the elements of a prima facie case and the requirements of
an efficiency defense.10 Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, merger
analysis takes efficiencies into account in two ways. First, certain categorical
assumptions about efficiencies are made in determining where the line for
prima facie illegality should be drawn.11 Second, however, the Merger Guidelines recognize a specific efficiencies “defense” that is available once prima
facie illegality has been established; the burden of proof for an efficiencies
defense ordinarily lies with the defendant, or the proponents of the merger.12

5

See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 970–76.
E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1224, 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1995),
aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding substantial efficiencies from elimination of overhead expenses,
but rejecting the FTC’s case on market definition grounds). On the burden-shifting framework applied in
merger analysis see infra, text accompanying notes 131–133.
7 See infra, text accompanying notes 43–44.
8 See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1560–63
(2011); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON. L. REV.
833, 873–79 (2011).
9 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
10 Id. § 10.
11 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 32–41.
12 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 32–41.
6
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Recent empirical literature suggests that merger policy today is under
deterrent. That is, current enforcement policy is more likely to permit an anticompetitive merger than to prohibit a harmless one.13 At the same time,
however, the fault appears not to lie with the efficiencies defense. The defense has rarely been successfully raised to justify a merger after the government has made out a prima facie case of illegality. Thus, the under deterrence
problem must lie in the prima facie case itself.
In highly competitive, undifferentiated markets anticompetitive price
increases (or quality reductions) are unlikely to be a motivating factor for a
merger. The post-merger firm still lacks significant market power, and the
market is no more conducive to collusion than it had been prior to the merger.
In that case efficiency gains must be the rationale for the merger. But as markets become more concentrated or differentiated, anticompetitive consequences become more plausible. More concentrated markets encourage collusion or other forms of coordinated interaction,14 particularly when there are
only three, four, or a few more firms in the post-merger market.15 In markets
that are differentiated by product or geography, mergers between relatively
“proximate” firms in product or geographical space can facilitate unilateral
price increases.16 This may also be true for markets in which information flow
is limited or markets characterized by auction style pricing.17 As the case for
13

See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 90–91.
The term “coordinated interaction” refers to both explicit price fixing and more tacit forms of
collusion. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines give this definition:
Coordinated interaction involves conduct by multiple firms that is profitable for each of them
only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. These reactions can blunt a
firm’s incentive to offer customers better deals by undercutting the extent to which such a
move would win business away from rivals. They also can enhance a firm’s incentive to raise
prices, by assuaging the fear that such a move would lose customers to rivals. Coordinated
interaction includes a range of conduct. Coordinated interaction can involve the explicit negotiation of a common understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing. Such
conduct typically would itself violate the antitrust laws. Coordinated interaction also can involve a similar common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced
by the detection and punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated interaction. Coordinated interaction alternatively can involve parallel accommodating conduct not
pursuant to a prior understanding.
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 7.
15 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 916–18.
16 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6; 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 914.
17 See Gregory J. Werden, The Relevant Market Concept in Antitrust Law, in GLOBAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS: CURRENT ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND LAW & ECONOMICS 117, 122–24 (Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2016). See generally, Gregory J. Werden, The Relevant Market: Possible
and Productive, ANTITRUST L.J. ONLINE, Apr. 2014, at 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_law_journal/at_alj_werden.authcheckdam.pdf. In an auction market it is often the
buyers rather than the products that are differentiated. For example, even an auction for a fungible product
could end up in a bidding war among two or three bidders, and eliminating one of these by merger could
affect the price.
14
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either of these anticompetitive outcomes becomes stronger, so does the
strength of a noncompetitive explanation for the motivation underlying a
merger.
The “substantially lessen competition” language of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is not self-defining, and it has meant different things at different
times.18 Lessening competition could be a reference to simple rivalry, or the
number of firms in a market. Under that understanding, every horizontal merger lessens competition by reducing the number of rivals. The statutory
phrase might also refer to general welfare, which would trade off possible
consumer injuries against efficiency gains.19 Finally, it could be a reference
to output and prices: a merger “substantially” lessens competition if it reduces output in the market and results in increased prices. This definition
comes closest to the approach to merger policy reflected in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and applied today by both the Agencies and the
courts.20
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was substantially amended in 1950 by the
Celler-Kefauver Act,21 which was first applied by the Supreme Court in its
1962 Brown Shoe22 decision. Neither the original language of Section 7 nor
the amended language ever mention efficiencies as a defense, although there
are some references to such a rationale in the legislative history of the revisions.23 However, the statute does condemn only those mergers that may
“substantially lessen” competition.24 Therefore, an efficiencies defense may
be built in, so to speak, to the extent that cost savings can reduce or completely offset the threat to competition. That is, the very concept of substantially lessening competition refers to competitive harm that outweighs any
likely efficiencies.
Brown Shoe did not raise the issue, but it clearly did not recognize an
efficiency defense to a merger. To the contrary, the Supreme Court approved
of the district court's analysis that the merger should be condemned precisely
because it enabled the post-merger firm to produce shoes of better quality or
at a lower cost, thus injuring its rivals.25 Five years later the Supreme Court
18

Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–70.
20 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 1.
21 Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2012)).
22 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
23 For example, during the debates Senator Estes Kefauver asked about a merger of two newspapers
“in order to save the expense of operating in two separate buildings.” Senator Herbert O’Conor replied
that such a merger would not be unlawful because if that were the only effect “competition would be
stimulated rather than lessened.” 96 CONG. REC. 16,456 (1950) (statements of Sen. Kefauver and Sen.
O’Conor).
24 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
25 See United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff’d 380 U.S. 294
(1962):
19
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reaffirmed that view, concluding that “[p]ossible [efficiencies] cannot be
used as a defense to illegality.”26 There, the Court reasoned that although
Congress “was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also
result in [efficiencies]” it “struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”27
But merger policy changed remarkably in the 1970s and the years that
followed. The government did not take very seriously the general proposition
that a merger should be condemned simply because it reduced costs or improved products.28 Indeed, in 1968 the Antitrust Division's first set of Merger
Guidelines acknowledged that “improvements in efficiency” should be
treated as a mitigating factor in merger law.29 Nevertheless, the Antitrust Division concluded that the ordinary market concentration standards used for
assessing merger illegality should be sufficient because challenges to mergers of “companies operating significantly below the size necessary to
achieve significant economies of scale” would be rare.30 In other words, the
substantive standards of illegality already assumed and accounted for merger
efficiencies. Beginning in 1982, the Merger Guidelines elaborated more on
an efficiency defense.31 Since that time the defense has been expanded in
successive editions of the Merger Guidelines, but the fact remains that the
defense has almost never been asserted successfully against a prima facie
unlawful merger.

[I]ndependent retailers of shoes are having a harder and harder time in competing
with company-owned and company-controlled retail outlets. National advertising
by large concerns has increased their brand name acceptability and retail stores
handling the brand named shoes have a definite advertising advantage. Companyowned and company-controlled retail stores have definite advantages in buying and
credit; they have further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory control . .
. and price control. These advantages result in lower prices or in higher quality for
the same price and the independent retailer can no longer compete . . .
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016)
(noting Brown Shoe’s rejection of efficiencies defense).
26 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
27 Id.
28 See Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement
of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1927 (2015) (explaining that the 1968 Merger Guidelines were concerned with mergers which discouraged price competition and encouraged inefficient production methods).There were a few exceptions. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 515–18 (3d Cir. 1969) (condemning a merger between a manufacturer of rolling mills,
used in the production of steel, and a manufacturer of the electric hook-ups for such mills, because the
merger would create “the only company capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal
rolling mill,” and this “would raise higher the already significant barriers to the entry of others.”).
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, MERGER GUIDELINES ¶ 10 (1968), http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES].
30 Id.
31 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, MERGER GUIDELINES 29 (1982), http://www.
justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines.
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While evidence suggests that current merger policy is under deterrent,
an efficiencies defense rarely results in a successful rebuttal of an established
prima facie case of a merger’s illegality—suggesting that the problem lies
elsewhere. This Article begins by describing the burden shifting framework
employed in challenged merger litigation under the Merger Guidelines in
Part I. Part II, explores the welfare standard underlying the Merger Guidelines, particularly in relation to the efficiency defense, by analyzing and considering the general welfare and consumer welfare standards as well as welfare tradeoff models. Part III analyzes how efficiency claims are assessed—
and how they should be assessed—by courts under the Merger Guidelines.
I.

“DEFENSE” OR PRIMA FACIE CASE?

Today courts assessing mergers apply a burden shifting framework in
which the government or private plaintiff challenging a merger must first establish a prima facie case of illegality.32 Most mergers are challenged for one
of two reasons. First is the traditional rationale that the merger will reduce
the number of firms in a market. In highly concentrated markets this will
increase the likelihood of price fixing or other forms of coordinated interaction that threatens to reduce output and raise prices. Alternatively, in product
differentiated markets certain firms may be more adjacent in product space,
usually because of product similarity or occasionally due to geographic proximity; whereas other firms are more remote. A merger of two of the more
adjacent firms can permit a price increase between those two firms while the
rest of the market remains mostly unaffected. This “unilateral effects” theory
has been quite upsetting to traditional merger analysis, and may not even require a market definition.33 The underlying principle is that a firm’s ability to
raise its price profitability depends on the number of sales it will lose. If a
firm acquires a close rival, fewer sales will be diverted away from the merging firms, and a price increase is more likely to be profitable.34 In auction
markets, even if the product is undifferentiated buyers may not be. A merger

32 This burden shifting framework is generally identified with the decision in United States v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also discussion infra, text accompanying notes 108–112.
33 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. OF THEORETICAL ECON. 1, art. 9, 14–15 (2010). For a simple,
nontechnical explanation, see Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring
1996, at 23, 23.
34 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 12.3d (5th ed. 2015). On the history, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Re-Imagining Antitrust: The
Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1230–33 (2016).
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that eliminates competition between, say, the highest and second highest bidder can also harm competition.35
If the merger challenge’s initial analysis suggests that under either the
traditional concentration theory or the unilateral effects theory the merger
will increase prices, the burden shifts to the proponents of the merger to show
efficiencies. These must be either cost reductions, product improvements, or
other innovation that result from the merger.36 Whether this evidence of efficiencies is sufficient to rebut the challenger’s prima facie case depends on a
number of factors, including the particular welfare test that the merger analysis applies;37 the nature of the claimed efficiencies,38 the robustness of the
evidence for them,39 and their magnitude in relation to the predicted competitive harm; 40 and whether or not the claimed efficiencies are “merger specific.”41
Today, the view held by the Agencies and expressed in the Merger
Guidelines is that most mergers are socially beneficial because they lead to
cost reductions or improved output, but with a few exceptions.42 As a result,
a background assumption about efficiencies is built into the initial analysis.
Indeed, since the Reagan administration the government has challenged
fewer than 2% of the mergers that are sufficiently large that they must be
reported.43 This makes an efficiency defense theoretically relevant although
perhaps not essential. One might conclude, as the 1968 Merger Guidelines
did, that the market structure standards used by the Agencies are sufficiently
tolerant to take the general run of efficiencies into account.44

35 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Choosing Among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Merger Effect, 7 EURO. COMPETITION J. 155, 173–74 (2011).
36 On the latter, see Gilbert & Greene, supra note 28, at 1929, 1939–40 (concluding that the Agencies’ recognition of innovation as a qualifying efficiency must be more specific and empirically supported,
and the Agencies must be more transparent about how innovation claims are evaluated).
37 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–128.
38 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 158–165.
39 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 131–138.
40 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–70.
41 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 120–193.
42 See generally, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1. See also, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES
49
(2006),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2152
47.pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006)].
43 Fewer than 1% of acquisitions were challenged during the George W. Bush administration. The
Obama administration was more aggressive, challenging about 1.5% of mergers. Even this number is
lower than the long-term average of 1.8% since the Reagan administration. See Melissa Maleske, How
Antitrust Authorities View Mergers and Acquisitions, INSIDECOUNSEL (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.
insidecounsel.com/2013/03/26/how-antitrust-authorities-view-mergers-and-acquisi.
44 See COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), supra note 42, at 49–59
(listing numerous cases in which consideration of efficiencies guided an Agency decision not to challenge
a merger).
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Many mergers challenged for unilateral effects are evaluated under an
economic “upward pricing pressure” model that predicts the change in the
firms’ profit maximizing price before and after the merger.45 The models as
applied often include a built in general “credit” for presumed efficiency
gains, typically 10% of marginal cost,46 rather than seeking to quantify efficiencies on a case-by-case basis.47 In practice this approach need not differ
all that much from the structural approach taken in earlier editions of the
Merger Guidelines that suggested that efficiencies were simply assumed in
the market structure analysis. Under the market structure approach, prediction of merger efficiencies becomes part of the government's prima facie
evaluation.48 Without providing detail, the 2010 Merger Guidelines state that
the Agencies themselves will “look for reliable evidence” of efficiencies in
their initial assessment,49 and that the economic models that the Agencies use
to evaluate unilateral effects “can incorporate merger-specific efficiencies.”50
In sum, the Agency may simply assume efficiency gains of a certain magnitude or it may incorporate explicit evidence of such gains.
Of course, an arbitrary efficiency credit given in advance of specific
claims can either under- or overstate efficiencies. In practice, the process of
merger analysis contemplates a fairly generalized efficiency credit at early
review stages, but more detailed and case-specific inquiries later.51 In any
event, no matter what the government's opening analysis contemplates, once
a serious efficiency defense is raised in litigation the government must meet
45

See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 11, 28–29; Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 71–75 (2010); Joseph Simons
& Malcolm Coate, Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications for Merger Policy, 6
EUR. COMPETITION J. 377, 378–79 (2010).
46 On how efficiency claims are considered prior to a challenge decision, see Darren S. Tucker, A
Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 601–02 (2013). See
also Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches versus “Upward Pricing Pressure,” ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 6–7 (Feb. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Leonard2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf; Serge Moresi, The Use of Upward Price Pressure Indices in Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2–4 (2010), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Moresi2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf.
47 See Dennis Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
619, 644 (2010); Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 8–9. But see Steven C. Salop & Serge Moresi,
Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project (No.
P092900) (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/hori
zontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-545095-00032/545095-00032.pdf; Werden & Froeb, supra note
35, at 169–70.
48 See, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1, ex.19 (acknowledging
that once a price increase is predicted, “[f]urther analysis is required to account for repositioning, entry
and efficiencies.”).
49 Id. § 2.2.1.
50 Id. § 6.1.
51 James Langenfeld & Gregory G. Wrobel, Upward Pricing Pressure Analysis under the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 21, 24–25.
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it. The 2010 Merger Guidelines acknowledge that specific merger efficiency
claims need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; they list some important
factors whose effects vary from one situation to another.52 To be sure, relevant case law consistently insists on case-by-case evaluation, which naturally
requires some kind of measurement in each individual case where efficiencies are claimed.53
In 1976 Richard Posner advocated against any efficiencies defense that
would require case specific measurement. He concluded that “the measurement of efficiency (whether based on economies of scale, superior management, or whatever) [is] an intractable subject for litigation.”54 A quarter of a
century later, Judge Posner largely adhered to his position.55 Consistent expansions of the efficiency discussion in subsequent editions of the Merger
Guidelines, as well as its frequent assertion in litigation, indicates that Posner
did not have the last word on this subject.56 At the same time, litigants' general
lack of success in establishing the defense suggests that as a practical matter
he may be right after all.
Mergers are not the only area where efficiencies are relevant to antitrust
law. Many practices that are challenged under antitrust law's rule of reason
simultaneously threaten competitive harm while promising efficiency gains.
The purpose of the rule of reason in these situations is to determine whether
the participants have sufficient market power to make an anticompetitive restraint plausible and, if so, whether the restraint really does threaten to harm
competition by increasing prices or excluding rivals unreasonably.57 If such
52

See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10:
The Agencies have found that certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be
cognizable and substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the
merging firms to reduce the incremental cost of production, are more likely to be
susceptible to verification and are less likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output. Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification
and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those
relating to procurement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be mergerspecific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.
See also, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that
claimed efficiencies such as increased future innovation are not verifiable, particularly in light of the fact
that no contemporaneous internal documents discussed them; the government nevertheless lost on relevant
market issue). On sufficiency, see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52–53 (D.D.C.
2002) (holding that efficiencies were insufficient to overcome a high market concentration, whether or
not they were verifiable).
53 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 90–95.
54 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976).
55 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 133 (2d ed. 2001).
56 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 36–53.
57 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1500 (3d ed. 2010);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 371 (2016); Herbert Hovenkamp,
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a threat is found, the proponents of the arrangement can defend the action by
showing that the arrangement produces offsetting efficiencies.58 But even if
the defense is successfully claimed, the challenger can still go on to prevail
by showing a “less restrictive alternative” that would achieve the efficiencies
but without the restraint's harm to competition.59 This less restrictive alternative analysis is a rough equivalent to the Merger Guidelines' requirement that
claimed efficiencies be “merger specific.”60 That is, the proponents of the
merger must show that they could not reasonably have attained the claimed
efficiencies through some less harmful way other than the contemplated merger.61 As demonstrated below, the requirement that claimed efficiencies be
“merger specific” makes a great deal of sense under a general welfare test for
competitive harm from mergers.62 It makes considerably less sense, however,
under the quasi-consumer welfare test that the Agencies actually employ.63
II.

ASSESSING MERGER EFFICIENCIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE WELFARE
MODELS

How efficiencies are assessed in merger analysis partly depends on the
underlying goals of the antitrust laws—in particular, on which definition of
“welfare” the antitrust laws apply. As a matter of theory, merger efficiency
analysis is one area where the choice of a welfare standard test matters to
both the enforcement Agencies and the courts. Today, the principal debate
over antitrust welfare tests concerns whether antitrust policy should adopt a
The Rule of Reason (working paper, Jan. 2, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2885916.
58 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, ¶ 1504b.
59 Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 929
(2016). See also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, ¶ 1505.
60 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
61 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C. 1998) (observing that
while merging hospitals presented significant evidence of cost savings,
The critical question raised by the efficiencies defense is whether the projected savings from
the mergers are enough to overcome the evidence that tends to show that possibly greater benefits can be achieved by the public through existing, continued competition. The Defendants
simply have not made their case on this point.
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 351 (3d Cir. 2016) (increased ability to engage in risk-based contracting not merger specific); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Staples,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting an efficiency study submitted by the defendant
that purported to show large cost savings, stating that “the evidence shows that the defendants did not
accurately calculate which projected cost savings were merger specific and which were, in fact, not related
to the merger.”). The court also rejected the methodology that the defendants used to calculate the cost
savings, and found no support for the conclusion that two-thirds of the savings would be passed on to
customers. Id.
62 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 184–189.
63 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 190–191.
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“general welfare” or a “consumer welfare” approach. As a basic matter, the
general welfare test is more difficult to apply and makes merger challenges
more difficult.
A.

Choosing a Welfare Model: Consumer Welfare Under the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines

“General welfare” tests in antitrust are derived from a conception of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, sometimes called “potential” Pareto efficiency.64
Under this standard a practice is said to be efficient even though it produces
both gains and losses, provided that the gains exceed the losses.65 The term
“potential” Pareto is helpful for understanding such situations. A pure Pareto
improvement implies only gains, or at least gains and indifference, for everyone—there are no losers.66 But a practice is efficient in the “potential” Pareto sense if the gainers gain enough that they could completely compensate
the losers, leaving the losers indifferent.67 In that case, ex post compensation
from gainers to losers would turn the practice into a Pareto improvement.68
Importantly, the potential Pareto test does not require that losers actually be
compensated, but only that the gainers' gains be large enough to make satisfactory compensation possible.69 For example, a merger that produced $5
million in efficiency gains while raising aggregate prices by $4 million would
be counted as efficient, assuming it did no other harm beyond raising prices.
The gains in this example are large enough to permit the gainers (merging
firms) to compensate the losers (consumers paying a higher price) fully, and
still have some gains left over. Again, the fact that the post-merger firm does
not actually distribute the gains to the consumers paying a higher is irrelevant.
By contrast, a “consumer welfare” standard effectively requires a form
of actual compensation.70 The $5 million efficiency gain in the example
would satisfy the test only if at least $4 million of it were actually passed on
to consumers, thus yielding prices that are no higher than they were prior to
the merger. Here, if consumers suffer harm, it does not matter that producers
are benefitted by an even greater amount. The merger that raises aggregate
prices by $4 million should be condemned, whether or not offsetting efficiency gains exceed $4 million.

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

For an introduction, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 2.3c.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 2.3c.
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The choice between these two antitrust welfare models has been fiercely
debated for decades.71 In 1978 Robert H. Bork famously described his approach to antitrust as adopting a “consumer welfare” model, when in fact it
was based entirely on general welfare.72 And while both sides of the debate
have strong supporters and detractors, the debate has had relatively little explicit impact on antitrust case law outside of the merger context. That said,
in the Supreme Court’s 2013 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.73
decision, all eight participating Justices appeared to accept a consumer welfare model.74
While the 2010 Merger Guidelines never uses the term “consumer welfare,” that appears to be the definition the drafters had in mind when articulating the tradeoff between competitive threats and efficiencies. The Merger
Guidelines state that cognizable efficiencies must be “of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant
market.”75 In making that determination, the Agencies consider whether the
efficiencies are “sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”76 As a result, a merger will not ordinarily be approved unless it makes
consumers no worse off than they were prior to the merger. Of course, where
the effect of efficiencies passed on to consumers is sufficiently large so as to
keep prices at pre-merger levels there is no consumer harm in the first place.
And though the Merger Guidelines may seem to leave a small amount of
wiggle room for approving a merger that actually results in a price increase,
it has proven to not be very much.
In fact, one is hard pressed to find any American antitrust decision
where the court clearly found that a practice (merger or otherwise) actually
injured consumers by raising prices, but then approved the practice by concluding that consumer losses were more than offset by efficiency gains.77
71 See, e.g., Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON.
S19, S26–31 (2014); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2471, 2474–77 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago., 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 234
(1985); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 237–40 (2008); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69 (1982); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2
of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 660–67 (2010); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2253, 2274–77 (2013).
72 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107–15 (1978).
73 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
74 Id. at 2234–35, 2238. Justice Alito did not participate.
75 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
76 Id. The use of “e.g.” is very likely intended to suggest that the government might approve some
kind of consumer gain as an alternative to price effects, but these are not stated.
77 Canadian antitrust law, which adopts a total welfare approach, includes one much debated decision, which both recognized that a challenged merger between two producers of liquefied gas would cause
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That is, the cases tend toward a consumer welfare approach—even if they
rarely articulate it.
B.

Welfare “Tradeoffs”

Under either articulation of a welfare test, welfare “tradeoff” models
attempt to guide legal policy by assessing both the harms and benefits of a
particular practice and balancing them against each other. The best-known
welfare tradeoff model for mergers was developed by Oliver E. Williamson,
and applies a general welfare test.78 However, even under a consumer welfare
model, assessment of tradeoffs is necessary. The lines of legality are simply
drawn in a different place. In a general welfare model, legality requires that
producer gains be sufficiently large to offset consumer losses, but consumer
losses are still acceptable.79 By contrast, in a consumer welfare model, the
efficiency gains must be so large that the resulting price to consumers is no
higher than prior to the merger.80 Assuming that the savings show up in variable costs,81 increased savings from efficiencies will cause the post-merger
firm's profit-maximizing price to be lower. If the structural effects of a merger generally tend to push prices upward when efficiencies are not present, it
will take larger efficiency gains to produce legality under a consumer welfare
test than under a general welfare test.
Williamson's welfare tradeoff model, illustrated by Figure 1 below,
shows a market that was perfectly competitive prior to a merger, with price
(P1) equal to cost (C1).82 The merger has two results. First, it enables the firm
to raise its price from P1 to P2. Secondly, efficiencies resulting from the merger permit the firm to reduce its costs from C1 to C2. Triangle A1 represents
the deadweight loss to consumers, while oblong rectangle A2 represents gains

a price increase, but approved the merger because it was thought to produce even larger offsetting efficiencies. Comm’r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc., 2003 F.C.A. 53, para. 57–58 (Can.); see Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrie, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States,
Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 454–56 (2005); Darwin V. Neher, et. al.,
Lessons from the Superior-ICB Merger, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 289, 306–07 (2003); Richard O. Zerbe,
Jr. & Sunny Knott, An Economic Justification for a Price Standard in Merger Policy: The Merger of
Superior Propane and ICG Propane, in 21 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST LAW &
ECONOMICS 409, 416-18 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004).
78 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AMER.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 970–76; Robert Pitofsky,
Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 485–87 (1999); Oliver
E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 706–09 (1977).
79 Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 2472–77.
80 Id.
81 On different types of cost savings, see discussion infra, text accompanying notes 158–171.
82 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 707
(1977).
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that accrue to the firm as a result of the merger-created efficiencies.83 In this
case, while the efficiency gains are significant, they do not completely offset
the price increase, so the price rises. Merger analysis under a general welfare
test would require the fact finder to determine whether the area of triangle A1
(consumer deadweight loss) was greater or less than the area of rectangle A2
(producer gains). Williamson then showed that a relatively modest efficiency
gain would be sufficient to make such a merger welfare increasing rather than
welfare reducing under the general welfare test.84 By contrast, under a consumer welfare test this merger would be unlawful because the post-merger
price is higher than the pre-merger price.85 Williamson did not address that
issue.

83

Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
85 See Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 2473 (“If consumers are harmed (either by reduced output or
product quality or by higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power), then this fact trumps any
amount of offsetting gains to producers and presumably to others.”).
84
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Figure 1

Williamson described his own model as “naive,” and it is subject to several qualifications, some quite severe.86 First, the most common historical
reason for condemning mergers is that they facilitate collusion, or “coordinated interaction” in the terms of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.87
Successful collusion reduces output and raises price above cost.88 But collusion is a market wide phenomenon, not simply limited to the merging parties.
As a result, mergers that facilitate coordinated interaction permit all firms in
the market to raise their prices, a fact that has been borne out both theoretically and empirically.89 For example, suppose the merger in Figure 1 created
a post-merger firm with a 40% market share, in the process facilitating collusion with other firms. In that case, though the full 100% of firms in the
market might likely collude and raise their prices, the efficiencies created by
the merger would benefit only the post-merger firm, with its 40% market
share. In order to assess the true social cost of such a merger, one must look
at harm across all sales, including the sales of the firms constituting the 60%
86

Williamson, supra note 82, at 706; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 2480.
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 7.1.
88 See id. § 1.
89 See Martin K. Perry & Robert H. Porter, Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 219, 220 (1985); George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON.
REV. 23, 31–33 (1950) (merging benefits other firms in the market); see also Matthew Weinberg, The
Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433, 436–38 (2008) (summarizing
several empirical studies concluding that in most cases subsequent to mergers rival firms as well as the
merger partners increased their prices).
87
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of the market that did not realize any post-merger efficiencies—but merely
enjoyed the price increase. All else being the same, the consumer deadweight
loss would be two-and-one-half times larger than Williamson's figure suggests.
This critique actually had more force at the time Williamson published
his paper in 1968 than it does today. At that time, courts were frequently
condemning mergers on the basis of market concentration, despite relatively
small (by today’s standards) post-merger market shares, often on the order
of 10% or less.90 As a result, if such a merger facilitated collusion, the price
effects would very likely dwarf the efficiency effects. By contrast, today a
merger of two firms, each with 20% market share, would very likely be challenged on collusion grounds only if one or more other firms in the market
were also quite large.91 In any event, if the merger is condemned on the fear
of market wide coordination, then the analysis must consider price effects
across all firms whose coordinated prices rise, while the relevant efficiencies
accrue only to the post-merger firm. In the Federal Trade Commission v. H.J.
Heinz Co.92 baby food case, where the merger was challenged on concentration increasing grounds, the merging partners (Heinz and Beech-Nut) together controlled a little less than 35% of the market.93 In the Saint Alphonus
Medical Center—NAMPA, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System94 case, also challenged on concentration increasing grounds, the post-merger firm accounted
for 70% to 80% of the relevant market.95 Full assessment of efficiencies in
either of these cases would require the court to consider the price impact on
non-merging competitors.
In unilateral effects cases, it is possible and even quite likely that nonmerging parties will increase their prices as well, although not by as much as
the prices of the merging firms increase.96 For example, non-merging firms
might reposition themselves in order to take advantage of the fact that two

90

United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (condemning the merger of two
small grocery chains with a combined market share of 7.5% of a highly competitive market); see also
1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 4 (identifying as “highly concentrated” a market in which
the acquiring and acquired firm each had at least 4% of the market).
91 Assuming a concentration threshold of 2500 HHI, and a market of A=20, B=20, C=20, D=20,
E=10, F=10, the post merger-HHI after a merger between A and B would be 2600, which the 2010 Guidelines would identify as highly concentrated. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9,
§ 5.3.
92 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93 Id. at 718 n.14.
94 See Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d
775 (9th Cir. 2015).
95 Id. at *13.
96 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers,
in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 46 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).
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rivals, now having become one, raised their price and reduced their output.97
One likely result is that these non-merging competitors produce more but
also charge higher prices, given that total market output is smaller as a result
of the merger.98 Once again, the non-merging firms may produce additional
consumer harm but no offsetting efficiencies.
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines generally require that the postmerger firm's prices be no higher than they were prior to the merger.99 If that
is the case, the prices of non-merging competitors would not ordinarily increase either, for they would be forced to match a downward rather than upward price movement. That is, if merger efficiencies actually led to lower
prices, not only would consumers of the post-merger firm benefit, but so too
would consumers of other firms in the market that were forced to compete
with the post-merger firm’s lower price. So the Williamson model errs in
both directions, depending on whether the post-merger firm’s prices go up or
down.
A second, related problem with the Williamson model is that it assumed
that A1 in the figure was the entire social cost of a merger. That might be true
in some cases, but not necessarily in others. The merger contemplated by the
model is highly profitable, producing gains equal to A2 (efficiency) + A3
(noncompetitive pricing).100 A firm pursuing these profits would be willing
to spend up to the value of such profits in order to obtain them. Whether the
investments made in pursuit of these profits are themselves efficient would
depend on the circumstances, but in at least some circumstances they would
not be. For example, the firm might engage in noncompetitive pricing to beat
down the value of a rival's firm before acquiring it.101
1.

Output Reducing Mergers Under a General Welfare Standard

A third and quite significant problem with Williamson's naive model is
that if the merger results in higher prices, the efficiencies must occur at output
levels that are lower than they were prior to the merger. Of course, efficiencies might be so substantial that post-merger output is higher, and prices
lower, than pre-merger levels. But in that case there is nothing to trade off—
both producers and consumers would benefit from the merger. The “tradeoff”
97 See Jonathan B. Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 25, 25 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012);
Werden & Froeb, supra note 97, at 51.
98 Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: Basic Concepts and
Models, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1319, 1322, 1327 (2008).
99 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 2.1.1.
100 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968).
101 See generally, Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807 (1975).
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model in Figure 1 comes into play only when the merger causes a reduction
in output (a shift from Q1 to Q2 in the figure) but also causes significant efficiency gains.
The most common efficiency is the economy of scale—i.e., cost reductions that accrue as output is increased. The 1968 Merger Guidelines recognized economies of scale as the only relevant efficiency.102 Over some longer
run, even a merger that results in a short-term output reduction might facilitate economies of scale. For example, two firms might operate inefficiently
small plants with a capacity of fifty units each. The new post-merger firm
might sell eighty units, and an eighty unit plant might be more efficient than
a fifty unit plant. But the merger itself does not create the modern eighty unit
plant. Rather, it simply gives the post-merger firm two inefficiently small
fifty unit plants. Perhaps one plant can be re-engineered and the other closed,
but this does not follow naturally and it raises questions about whether the
claimed efficiency was really merger specific.103 For example, perhaps either
firm acting alone could have built a larger more efficient plant.
Other qualifying efficiencies might also accrue at reduced output levels.
But, while attaining efficiencies at lower output levels is not impossible, each
claim must be explained and proven. For instance, the post-merger firm
might reallocate production so that each plant is more specialized after the
merger. Or the merger might facilitate cost reducing vertical integration by
enabling better use of supply sources or distribution networks. Some efficiencies, such as better management or better intellectual property, might
certainly be attained at lower output; but these tend not to be merger specific,
because they can be acquired by other means. Otherwise they are very difficult to prove.104 Still other efficiencies, like the increased ability to compete
in a larger market, might be plausible but appear to imply that output will be
larger after the merger.105
One possibility for efficiencies at lower output is a merger that shifts
production from one merging firm's obsolete, high cost plant to the other
merging firm's more modern, low cost plant. In the Heinz case, the district
court found that the contested merger would permit Beech-Nut, which had
an obsolete plant, to transfer production to merger partner Heinz, whose plant
was modern but underutilized.106 Such a transfer of output might reduce variable costs of production even though aggregate output was lower than the
output of the two firms prior to the merger.107
102

1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, ¶ 10.
On “merger specific” efficiencies, see discussion infra, text accompanying notes 190–193.
104 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
105 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d
260 (8th Cir. 1995) (accepting defense that merging hospitals would be able to compete better at the
regional level and would have less overhead and administrative duplication; Eighth Circuit denied the
FTC’s request for an injunction, mainly for failure to show relevant geographic market).
106 H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721.
107 Id.
103
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One problem with this defense is that it proceeds from the premise that
only one of the merging firms was inefficient, while the other was not. But
the rationale for considering efficiencies is that the merger introduces a more
efficient firm into the market.108 A merger between two firms that are both
inefficient for reasons relating either to scale or technological obsolescence
can accomplish that.109 However, if one of the firms is already efficient, then
the merger does not add an efficient firm to the market; it only increases
concentration.110 The rationale for approving such a merger is protecting the
inefficiently small firm from losing out in a competitive struggle. In this case,
for example, Heinz had an efficient yet underutilized plant.111 The ordinary
competitive outcome would be that Heinz would produce more, particularly
given its lower variable costs. Beech-Nut might go out of business or it might
figure out ways to modernize. But protecting an inefficient rival from competition is neither the rationale underlying merger policy in general nor the
efficiency defense in particular.112 Of course, if the more efficient firm were
to acquire the less efficient firm and, after cost reductions, produce just as
much as it had prior to the merger, then there would be no harm and thus no
illegality.
The problem of efficiencies at lower output under a general welfare
model disappears under the consumer welfare standard, because the merger
would be approved only if output were at least as high after the merger as it
had been before. Assuming the merger were prima facie unlawful, the proponents would have to show that efficiencies were so substantial that output
would be as high or higher subsequent to the merger, and consumer prices as
low or lower.
2.

The Assumption of Pre-Merger Perfect Competition

A fourth problem with Williamson's model is also severe. Williamson
assumed a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger but monopolized thereafter.113 Virtually no challenged mergers today fall into that
category. Most mergers attacked on coordination increasing grounds occur
in moderately concentrated markets where pre-merger prices are already substantially above marginal cost.114 The same thing is very likely true in unilateral effects cases involving product differentiated firms where the merger
partners are reasonably close to one another in product space and most non108
109
110
111
112
113
114

See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 901.
Id.
Id. ¶ 976b.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721.
4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 901.
See Williamson, supra note 100, at 21.
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 9, §§ 5.3, 7.1.
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merging firms are more remote. In product differentiated markets where this
is possible, pre-merger prices are almost never at marginal cost.115 When premerger prices are above the competitive level to begin with, the situation can
depart quite far from Williamson’s model, as Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2

Figure 2 shows the same market as Figure 1, with a price increase (P1
to P2) and output reduction (Q1 to Q2) of the same magnitude.116 The difference is that the price in Figure 2 is already above marginal cost prior to the
merger. In Figure 1 P1 and C1 are the same, while in Figure 2 P1 is higher
than C1. This situation creates two notable differences from Figure 1. First,
the total loss that results from the merger is greater. The triangular top part
of A1, the consumer deadweight loss triangle, is the same size, but in addition
the lower part of A1 represents lost profits to producers who are producing
less as a result of the merger, and in an area where margins are higher than
in Figure 1.117 Second, because output in Figure 2 is lower to begin with,
given the higher prices prior to the merger, the efficiency gains are spread
over a smaller output than in Figure 1. As a result, while A2 (efficiency gains)
is clearly larger than A1 (consumer + producer losses) in Figure 1, in Figure
2 it is not.
As Figure 2 illustrates, a price increase of the same magnitude (P1 to P2
in both figures), coupled with per unit efficiencies that are also of the same
115
116

Id. § 6.1.
See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET. AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 213 (4th ed.

2005).
117

The profit change from an output decrease is the number of units multiplied by the margin.
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magnitude, produces larger net welfare losses when the pre-merger margins
were larger to begin with. The consumer-welfare based efficiency test in the
Merger Guidelines does not require that the post-merger price be competitive, though.118 It merely requires that the post-merger price be no higher than
the pre-merger price.119 That means that the price reduction attributable to
efficiencies must be at least large enough to offset the merger's propensity to
increase prices when efficiencies are not taken into account.
The figures assume that the output reduction resulting from the merger
is the same in the two situations that they describe.120 Whether or not that is
true depends on a number of factors, including the overall market structure,
the degree of competition between the merging firms, the shape of the demand curve, as well as the competitiveness of third firms.121 At one extreme,
if two perfect competitors in a larger competitive market should merge there
will likely be no output reduction at all because, even collectively, they have
no power over price. By contrast, the situation that Williamson contemplated
was a duopoly of two firms behaving as perfect competitors prior to the merger (i.e., in Bertrand competition), but then having a monopoly thereafter.122
In that case, output would go from the competitive level to the monopoly
level—an extremely rare situation.
In contrast, Figure 2 describes a market that was not perfectly competitive prior to the merger. In that case, the magnitude of the output reduction
is heavily driven by the degree of competitiveness between the merging parties, and thus by the size of price/cost margins.123 In general, if the difference
between the pre-merger markets is merely the intensity of interparty competition, then the output reduction will always be larger where the pre-merger
market was more competitive to begin with.124 But if the difference is merely
how closely the merging parties compete with third party rivals, then the
merger's output reduction will be larger where the market was less competitive beforehand.125
If the merging parties hardly competed with each other at all prior to the
merger, then the output reduction from the merger will be very small. Conversely, if the merging parties are extremely close competitors, then it will
be large, approaching the duopoly to monopoly outcome in extreme cases.
This of course is the rationale for unilateral effects merger theory, which

118

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
Id.
120 Compare VISCUSI ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213, with Williamson, supra note 82, at 707. Thank
you to Erik N. Hovenkamp for these observations.
121 VISCUSI, ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.1a.
122 See Williamson, supra note 82, at 706.
123 VISCUSI, ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213.
124 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
125 Id.
119
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arose after Williamson wrote his article.126 However, another factor at play in
unilateral effects analysis is the relative proximity of the next best firms who
are not parties to the merger.127 For example, if the two merging firms are
very close in product space, but firm three is also very close, then the output
reduction will be relatively less to the extent that firm three is in a position to
steal output from the post-merger firm.
The problem of pre-merger supracompetitive prices illustrated in Figure
2 is most evident and significant under a general welfare test. In markets
where pre-merger price/cost margins are already high, it takes a much larger
efficiency gain to offset a price increase and output reduction of a given magnitude. Looking back across merger cases brought in the last three decades,
one common characteristic is that the markets were already relatively concentrated prior to the merger.128 That suggests that the market illustrated by
Figure 2 comes much closer to reality than the one suggested by Figure 1.
III. ASSESSING EFFICIENCY CLAIMS
In a merger challenge, the government has the burden of making out a
prima facie case of anticompetitive effects.129 Under the consumer welfare
test, this means establishing that the merger threatens a price increase in at
least one market or a showing of some other effect that will cause a substantial lessening of competition.130
A.

Burdens of Production and Proof

If the government is successful in establishing its prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the claim with a showing of merger specific efficiencies.131 This burden shifting framework is sometimes referred to as the “Baker Hughes”132 formulation, developed in that decision
and later articulated by the D.C. Circuit in the Heinz case:
First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling
an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result

126 On the history of unilateral effects analysis, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Reimagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016).
127 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1.
128 See sources cited infra notes 145–146.
129 See supra Part I.
130 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
131 See infra text accompanying note 133.
132 E.g., Roger D. Blair, et al., Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66
(2016).
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[ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a showing establishes a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition.
To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show [s] that
the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger's] probable
effects on competition in the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts
the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of
persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.133

The test, as formulated in these decisions, refers to mergers challenged
on concentration increasing grounds, but the approach under unilateral effects analysis is similar.134
Several academics and practitioners have observed that courts require
stricter proof of merger-generated efficiencies than of predicted anticompetitive effects.135 This might seem odd in a system that ordinarily places most
of the litigation burden on plaintiffs, but in fact it is not. To a significant
extent, evidence concerning predicted price effects relates to the market and
predictions of consumer behavior.136 By contrast, evidence of efficiencies
133 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting United States
v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (citations and quotations omitted). See
also Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015)
(similar); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
676 (2014) (similar, dicta); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL
203966, *64 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (similar); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2011). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted):
The government usually makes a prima facie case by showing that the acquisition
at issue would produce “a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result [] in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market.”. . . If the government makes this showing, a presumption of
illegality arises. To rebut this presumption, the defendant must produce evidence
that “show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the
acquisition[‘s] probable effect[] on competition” in the relevant market . . . “If the
defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government . . .’”
[Some courts speak of a double shift: once the defendant meets the burden of showing efficiencies the burden shifts back to the government, which is entitled to present] “additional evidence of anticompetitive effects.”
134 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2015); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 (D.D.C. 2009).
135 Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 348 (2011) (“[T]he
government is accorded greater evidentiary leniency in proving anticompetitive effects than the merging
parties are in proving offsetting efficiencies.”). See also In Re Ardagh Group, S.A., Fed. Trade Comm’n
File No. 131-0087 (Apr. 11, 2014) (Wright, Com’r, dissenting), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/568821/140411ardaghstmt.pdf (protesting that “the burden facing the
agency with respect to the likelihood of anticompetitive effects should be in parity with that faced by the
parties with respect to efficiencies”).
136 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 135, at 373.
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typically relates to a firm's own internal production and processes. It makes
sense that general market predictions and analysis—supported by widely embraced economic tools and observable by many—requires less proof than
does a unique efficiency claim dependent on information that is often unobservable to outsiders. Or, as stated in the Merger Guidelines, “much of the
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.”137 Further, information is asymmetrical: firms almost always
know more about their own internal processes and the costs of changing them
than any outsider, including the merger enforcement Agencies. And, even
with this imbalance, merger enforcement remains under deterrent.138
B.

Price Effects of Marginal but Consummated Mergers

If merger policy is to be fact based, then one must consider how well
the current set of models and evidentiary requirements serve the goals of
merger enforcement policy. If these requirements result in fairly routine condemnation of competitively harmless mergers, then a correction should be
sought. The same would also be true if harmful mergers are routinely approved. In 2007, the federally created Antitrust Modernization Commission
issued a call for more empirical work on the effect of merger decisions.139
Since then, a large number of studies have examined the post-merger performance of mergers approved by the Agencies (including mergers approved
contingent on partial divestitures or other corrective measures).140 If merger
enforcement is operating as it should be, then mergers threatening price increases should be condemned and those that survive should prove harmless.
While the empirical evidence is not unanimous, however, it strongly suggests
that current merger policy tends to underestimate harm, overestimate efficiencies, or some combination of the two.141
The assumption must be that firms making acquisitions are acting rationally. Firms know their own business better than the generalist government antitrust agencies do, particularly when the relevant information is specific to the firm(s) rather than the market as a whole. As noted above, that is
almost always true of efficiency claims.142 Second, as profit-maximizing ac-

137

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
139 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50 (2007), http://gov
info.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (urging the agencies to do more
retrospective research on effects of merger enforcement decisions). See also Orley C. Ashenfelter et. al.,
Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14798, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14798.pdf.
140 See Ashenfelter et. al., supra note 139, at 4–5.
141 Id.
142 See discussion supra, text accompanying notes 135–138.
138
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tors that are responsible to their shareholders, firms will usually make acquisitions only if they anticipate profiting from them—and we should expect
that they will perform due diligence in assessing the source of those profits.
Not uncommonly, firms contemplating mergers hire expert consultants to
evaluate proposed transaction, looking for likely sources of profit.143
The due diligence point is doubly relevant given that the overall track
record of post-merger firm value and profit performance is quite troublesome. A large portion of acquisitions ultimately contribute little or nothing
to the value of the merging firms, particularly the acquiring firm.144 Thus,
firms contemplating mergers are hardly wading into territory where profitability is assured. As a result, one should presume that firms examine transactions very carefully before moving forward. In turn, requiring firms to prove
merger-specific efficiencies when such mergers are challenged should not be
unreasonably onerous. In fact, a firm that has not already done so in advance
is not behaving rationally.
Assuming that post-merger market structure supports the rationality inference, a firm that cannot convince itself that a merger will reduce costs or
improve product quality must believe that a merger’s profits will come from
post-acquisition price increases. The available data on post-merger product
pricing following mergers in concentrated or product differentiated markets
is not encouraging. Several studies have found that the returns to merging
are higher when industries are more concentrated.145 Indeed, consummated
143

E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 82 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that the
parties engaged in detailed pre-acquisition study directed by an independent consulting firm in order to
come up with estimate of merger efficiencies “Sysco, USF, and McKinsey reviewed a back-breaking
amount of information from the merging firms, analyzed historical integration data, modeled possible
cost-savings opportunities, and built a new organizational structure around the companies’ combined customer base, and designed detailed day 1, day 100, and year 1 plans for integration.”). Several consulting
firms hold themselves out as acquisition consultants for this purpose. See, e.g., AM. FORTUNE,
http://www.fortunebta.com/mergers-a-acquisitions/business-acquisition-services/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2017); CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., http://www.crai.com/engagement/analyzed-effects-merger-digital-storage-and-networking (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); BAIN & CO., http://bain.com/consulting-services/
mergers-and-acquisitions/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
144 See BARBARA S. PETITT & KENNETH R. FERRIS, VALUATION FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
8 (2d ed. 2013) (stating that the value of acquired firms will go up in the short term, while value of the
acquirer declines in both short and medium terms); G.A. Jarrell et. al., The Market for Corporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 66 (1988). A classic study if David J. Ravenscraft & Frederic M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers 14 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Working Paper
No.
136,
1986),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/profitability-mergers/
wp136.pdf (finding merged firms to be significantly less profitable than a control group that had not
merged).
145 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 107, 119 (1990) (greater profitability and incentives to merge in more concentrated industries); Dick
Hackbarth & Jianjun Miao, The Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions in Oligopolistic Industries, 36 J.
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 585, 604 (2012); see generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust
Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis
of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321 (1997).
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mergers in highly concentrated markets subject to close government scrutiny
tend to yield higher prices.146 In one FTC study, whose results appear to be
very robust, grocery store mergers in concentrated markets produced significant increases in product prices, while those in less concentrated markets
tended to produce price decreases.147 Similarly, most studies of carefully
scrutinized but ultimately approved airline mergers indicate post-acquisition

146

E.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers?
Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & ECON. S67, S74 (2014) (relying on studies finding higher
post-merger prices in a wide assortment of industries); Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of
Mergers on Consumer Prices Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin, 53 J. L. & ECON.
417, 455–58 (2010) (increases in four out of five analyzed mergers); Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., The Price
Effects of a Larger Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool, 5 AMERICAN ECON. J.:
ECON. POLICY 239, 259 (2013); Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433, 434 (2008) (prices generally increase after mergers in concentrated markets); see generally, Awi Federgruen & Margaret Pierson, The Impact of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions in Price Competition Models (Harv. Bus. School Working Paper No. 12-031, 2011),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-031.pdf; Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999); see
also Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG.
2371, 2425–35 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007) (including a survey of empirical studies); Michael
J. Doane, et al, Predicting Price Effects from Retail Mergers 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Owen Graduate Sch. of
Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2034464, 2013); Robert B. Kulick, Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity
2
(SSRN
Working
Paper,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2637961 (finding price increases exceeding productivity cost savings in mergers in the
ready-mix concrete industry subsequent to promulgation of 1982 Merger Guidelines).
147 Daniel Hosken et al., Do Retail Mergers Affect Competition? Evidence from Grocery Retailing
1, 3 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 313, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/do-retail-mergers-affect-competition%C2%A0-evidence-grocery-retailing/wp313.pdf; see also David E. Davis, Price and Promotion Effects of Supermarket Mergers, 8 J.
AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2010).
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price increases, often substantial.148 The same thing is generally true of mergers in banking,149 health care,150 and health insurance.151 Whether any of
these mergers created significant offsetting efficiencies is hard to say—but it
is apparent that whatever their significance, the magnitude of the efficiencies
were not sufficient to offset price increases. As a result, these mergers should
have been challenged under the standards articulated in the Merger Guidelines. The data shows that no general case can be made that merger policy as
applied today is over deterrent, either because prima facie cases are too easy

148

Severin Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power. 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 400, 402 (1990) (merger of TWA and Ozark airlines led to price increases 9% above industry averages); John Kwoka & Evgenia Shumilkina, The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 767, 769 (2010) (examining USAir/Piedmont merger:
large price effects where the two airlines were actual competitors; smaller but positive price effects where
one airline was a potential competitor); E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline Industry, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 549, 550 (1993); Craig T. Peters, Evaluating the
Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry 49 J. L. & ECON. 627, 647
(2006). One contrary study is Dennis W. Carlton, et al., Are Legacy Airline Mergers Pro- or Anti-Competitive? Evidence from Recent U.S. Airline Mergers (working paper, Oct. 25, 2016), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2851954 (finding improved post-merger performance).
149 Robin A. Prager and Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence from the Banking Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 450 (1998) (bank mergers in more concentrated markets significantly increased market power).
150 Jose R. Guardado et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Health Insurers: A Case Study of
UnitedHealth-Sierra, 16 HEALTH MGMT. POL’Y & INNOVATION 1, 2 (2013) (health insurers; case study
showing post-merger price increases); Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers
and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analysis, 18 J. ECON. OF BUS. 17, 30 (2011) (finding significant price increases following merger of Evanston Northwestern and Highland Park Hospitals in greater
Chicago); Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application to Hospital
Mergers, 52 J.L. & ECON. 523, 544 (2009) (hospitals; similar); Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital
Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction, 18 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUS. 65, 79 (2011) (finding large price effect from a closely scrutinized but approved merger); Ranjani A. Krishnan & Hema
Krishnan, Effects of Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions on Prices, 56 J. BUS. RES. 647, 655 (2003) (higher
prices and margins).
151 See Leemore S. Dafny, Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry Consolidation:
Learning from Experience, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/nov/evaluating-insurance-industry-consolidation; see generally
Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance
Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161 (2012).
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to make or qualifying efficiencies are too difficult to prove.152 Regardless,
more work certainly needs to be done in this area.153
These studies do not, and could not, assess the price effects of mergers
that were successfully challenged or abandoned. However, it seems highly
unlikely that the Agencies systematically challenge many harmless mergers
while letting many harmful ones go through. While individual errors are possible, the consummated mergers reported in these studies must be regarded
as more benign than those mergers that were never completed because of a
successful government challenge.
These findings also suggest that traditional concentration increasing
merger analysis must be taken seriously. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
(“HHI”) numbers in the 2010 Merger Guidelines were revised upwards from
those in previous versions of the Guidelines.154 The Merger Guidelines promulgated between 1982 and 1992 identified an HHI of 1800 as “highly concentrated,” while the 2010 Guidelines have moved that number to 2500.155
This shift may have been a result of a common complaint about enforcement
policy between 1992 and 2010—that the Agencies did not really follow the
Merger Guidelines.156 During that period, the Agencies in fact challenged
mergers facilitating coordinated interaction only on concentration thresholds

152

For a more pessimistic conclusion drawn by one prominent industrial organization economist,
see JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S.
POLICY 156, 158 (2015) (a comprehensive study concluding that “For all cases in which the agencies
challenged mergers, the outcome was nonetheless an average price increase of 7.71 percent, indicating
incorrect determinations or ineffective remedies…. [M]ost studied mergers result in competitive harm,
usually in the form of higher price.”); see also id. at 155 (“Of all mergers that resulted in price increases,
the agencies acted in only 38 percent of cases, suggesting substantial under-enforcement . . . .”). See also
Michael Vita & F. David Osinski, Johns Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Critical
Review (Fed. Trade Comm’n Working Paper, Dec. 22, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888485 (reviewing Kwoka book).
153 See Gregory J. Werden, Inconvenient Truths on Merger Retrospective Studies, 3 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 287, 288 (2015) (questioning approach taken by several of the studies showing price increases).
154 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 5.3.
155 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf.
156 The American Antitrust Institute made this complaint rather forcefully. See, e.g., The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th
President of the United States, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 141 (2008), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
files/Mergers%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%20Report_100520082108.pdf; see also
Deborah L. Feinstein, The Revised Merger Guidelines: Did the Agencies Heed the Lessons of the Past?,
ANTITRUST SOURCE 3 (Oct. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Oct10_Feinstein10_21f.authcheckdam.pdf. The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is
the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. On use of the HHI in merger analysis,
see HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.4a. For example, a market with four 20% firms and two 10% firms
would have an HHI of 202+ 202+ 202+ 202+ 102 + 102 or 2200. Id. It would be considered moderately
concentrated under the Guidelines. Id.
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far higher than the Guidelines suggested.157 Whether the revision was justified on the basis of the empirical evidence is difficult to say, but both predictability interests in policy making as well as the historical record suggest
that the 2010 Merger Guidelines need to be enforced more literally than were
the predecessors.
C.

Estimating Merger-Induced Variable Cost Savings

The approach taken in the 2010 Merger Guidelines requires not only
that significant efficiencies be proven, but also that these be sufficiently
“passed on” to consumers that that the post-merger price is no higher than
the pre-merger price.158 The main ingredients in computing pass through are
the nature of the cost savings and the elasticity of demand facing the postmerger firm.159 Variable costs savings will show up in marginal cost and thus
be calculated directly into the post-merger firm's prices. By contrast, fixed
costs do not ordinarily affect the price and thus would not be passed through,
at least in the short run.160 However, in practice the line between fixed and
variable costs is fairly soft, depending on such factors as use depreciation and
the length of the “run” that one is looking at.161 For example, over the long
run, increased investment in fixed cost infrastructure or IP rights could produce lower consumer prices, but these effects are unlikely to show up immediately.162 Empirically, there is some evidence that upward changes in costs
are more readily passed through than downward changes, at least over the
short run.163 Pass through is rarely 100%, but where a firm possesses some
level of market power, a certain percentage of variable cost savings should
be passed on.164 By contrast, under perfect competition165 in an undifferentiated product, cost reductions resulting from efficiencies that accrue to a single firm or a small number of firms are not passed on. A competitive firm
157

Feinstein, supra note 156, at 3.
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1.
159 Id.
160 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 740.
161 See id.
162 On the problems in classifying costs as fixed or variable for antitrust purposes, see id.
163 Robert A. Ritz, The Simple Economics of Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through 9 (Univ. of Cambridge
Energy Policy Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1515, 2015), http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/
research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1515.pdf; see generally Sam Peltzman, Prices Rise Faster than They Fall,
108 J. POL. ECON. 466 (2000).
164 See Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product, 58 ECON. LETTERS 367, 367 (1998); Jerry A. Hausman
& Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 GEO. L. REV. 707, 727 (1999);
Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409, 409 (1996).
165 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 280 (7th ed. 2015).
158
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will increase its output but, facing a horizontal demand curve, has no incentive to reduce its price.
In computing the effects of downward changes in variable costs, care
must be taken that the effects relate properly to the predicted impact on overall costs. This is particularly true for manufactured products whose principal
costs include raw materials, power, labor, or other inputs whose costs are not
readily affected by the merger. For example, while generic raw materials are
a variable cost, mergers rarely have a significant impact on material acquisition costs. The Heinz baby food case illustrates some of the problems.166 The
defendants claimed that variable costs were roughly 43% lower in the acquiring firm’s modern facility.167 The court found the figure to be much less, more
in the range of 20%.168 More importantly, however, were some other factors.
First, the cost savings applied only to the production that was shifted from
the obsolete plant—the production that was already located in the more efficient plant enjoyed no further cost savings.169
Second, variable cost savings almost never apply to all variable costs,
and in many cases they may apply only to a small percentage. To illustrate,
in the making of strained peas for baby food, both the peas and the processing
are variable costs. However, the merger does nothing to change the market
price of peas. Suppose that the variable cost of producing a $100 batch of
strained peas is $90 for raw materials (peas) and $10 for processing. A very
substantial 20% reduction in the cost of processing will reduce the $10 processing costs to $8, but it does nothing to the cost of the peas. As a result this
20% reduction in processing cost amounts to a 2% reduction in overall cost.170
The previously noted across-the-board assumptions of 10% cost reductions
in first pass merger assumptions assume that overall variable costs decline as
a result of the merger.171 That assumption is probably highly optimistic across
a wide variety of industries, depending on what percentage of variable costs
are actually reduced by the more efficient reduction that the merger promises.
Raw materials, labor, and utilities are all components of variable costs, but
few mergers do anything to change the per unit cost of these inputs.
D.

Measurement Difficulties

Assessing the overall impact of a merger subject to significant, evidence
based efficiency claims is difficult. The 2010 Merger Guidelines suggests the

166

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 721.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See id.; see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 974 (providing an example of how
reduced production costs do not reflect the total overall costs).
171 See discussion supra, text accompanying note 46.
167
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difficulty by its highly general statement on “balancing” anticompetitive effects against claimed efficiencies:
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be
the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to customers,
for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect
in the relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is
likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies
would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. In adhering
to this approach, the Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition,
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.
In the Agencies’ experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in
merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies,
are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly. Just as adverse competitive effects can arise along multiple dimensions of
conduct, such as pricing and new product development, so too can efficiencies operate along multiple dimensions. Similarly, purported efficiency claims based on
lower prices can be undermined if they rest on reductions in product quality or variety that customers value.172

The Merger Guidelines contain nothing more precise relating the magnitude of required efficiencies to the threat level.
Assessing mergers under a consumer welfare test is simpler than assessing them under a general welfare test, at least until one gets to the problem of estimating pass through. Under either standard, once the requirements
for a prima facie case have been met, administering merger policy with an
efficiency defense requires the challenger (and the courts) to find some way
to consider both price effects and efficiency effects.173 Literal “balancing” of
competitive harms against efficiency gains is virtually impossible.174 Balancing requires the fact finder to come up with cardinal (i.e., specific unit) measurements, and then net them out against each other.175 Competitive harms and
efficiency effects are rarely amenable to such a process. Rather, the Agencies
and the courts employ a very rough scale to conclude that the larger the predicted price increase or likelihood of anticompetitive effects, the greater the
showing of efficiencies will be required.176

172

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1.
For an argument that false positives are less important than false negatives because price-increasing mergers cannot readily be corrected by other antitrust provisions such as § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman
Act, see Lawrence M. Frankel. The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the
Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171 (2008).
174 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 976c (“‘Balancing’ implies an ability to assign
a common unit of measurement to the two things being balanced, and determine which outweighs the
other. Except in the clearest cases, this is simply not what courts are capable of doing.”); see generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 57.
175 Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 173.
176 Id. at 373–74.
173
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Under a general welfare test, the fact finder must make cardinal assessments of both harms and benefits.177 Analyzing a merger would require computation of the deadweight loss accruing to consumers, the magnitude of efficiency gains (cost savings per unit multiplied by the number of units of
post-merger production), and then netting these two numbers against one another.178 The merger is efficient, and thus lawful, if the efficiency gains outweigh the deadweight loss.179 This analysis requires information not merely
about the price impact of the merger, but also about the shape of the demand
curve and price-cost margins before and after the merger. For example, the
mergers in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above have the same output reduction and
price increase, but losses in Figure 2 are greater than in Figure 1 because
price-cost margins are higher, both prior and subsequent to the merger. Computing deadweight loss requires knowledge not only about the price-cost
margin, but also about the shape of the demand curve in the region between
the actual price and the competitive price.180
By contrast, under a consumer welfare test one needs to know only
whether the merger will cause output to go down and prices to go up—that
is, whether there will be any increase in consumer prices at all. This requires
information about the predicted price impact of the merger, offset by the efficiency reduction.181 Thus, the biggest difference between the two standards
is that under a general welfare standard, the magnitude of efficiencies will
have to be traded against consumer welfare losses. But, under a consumer
welfare standard, the price impact of efficiencies will have to be traded
against any upward pressure on price. That latter number is nearly always
easier to determine.182
Both approaches can produce both easy and hard cases. The easiest
cases, of course, will be mergers in competitive markets or where entry is
easy and there clearly could not be a durable price increase. But in those cases
efficiencies need not be measured at all, because there is no prima facie case
of illegality.183 At the other extreme will be highly threatening mergers where
the evidence for proffered efficiencies is weak.
One unique complicating factor in merger analysis under a consumer
welfare test is the pass through requirement. Pass through considers the extent to which reduced costs resulting from efficiency gains are passed on to
consumers—principally by lower prices—but conceivably by higher quality

177
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179
180
181
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183

Id. at 379.
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 380.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 380.
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or improved services as well.184 Pass through is irrelevant under a general
welfare test, and thus need not be computed; all that would matter is whether
efficiency gains outweigh consumer welfare losses. The approach taken by
the 2010 Merger Guidelines, however, requires that post-merger prices be no
higher than pre-merger prices.185 This does not require a precise measurement
of pass through, but only that pass through be shown to be at least large
enough to offset fully any price increase threatened by the merger.186 Thus,
once the challenger makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show both offsetting efficiencies and that a sufficient amount of
the savings will be passed on to correct the price increase. Furthermore, “the
greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must
be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to
customers . . . .”187 Initially this requirement was treated with a great deal of
skepticism, mainly because it was thought to be too difficult to prove.188 But
today, techniques are being developed that permit at least an approximation
of pass through.189

184 On the difficulties in measuring merger-induced changes in quality, see Roger D. Blair et al.,
Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2016) (focusing on hospital
mergers).
185 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 2.1.
186 Id. § 10.
187 Id.
188 Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729, 733 (1999) (arguing against rigid pass-on requirement); Robert Pitofsky,
Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 207–
08 (1993) (proof of pass-on requirement would be too difficult); accord Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 584 (1996) (agreeing with Pitofsky); see
also Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their
Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 41–43 (1993) (indicating that
a strict pass-on requirement “may foreclose any consideration of efficiencies because it is so difficult to
establish and because it prevents consideration of even large efficiencies if there is only some probability
that such efficiencies will be passed on to consumers”); accord U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
1–9 (1996), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/anticipating-21st-century-competitionpolicy-new-high-tech-global-marketplace/gc_v2.pdf.
189 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 592 (2010); Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First-Order Approach to Merger
Analysis, 5 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 188, 188–89 (2013); see also David Balto, The Efficiency
Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation, 16 ANTITRUST 74, 78 (Fall 2001) (noting the difficulty of computing pass on when the merger increases the market structure so as to lessen the amount of
competition); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., THE MERGER GUIDELINES AND THE INTEGRATION
OF EFFICIENCIES INTO ANTITRUST REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (the Antitrust Division’s own statement, including a historical perspective, authored by William J. Kolasky &
Andrew R. Dick), http://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/merger-guidelines-and-integration-efficiencies-antitrust-review-horizontal-mergers.
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Merger Specific” Efficiencies: Important or Irrelevant?

The Merger Guidelines emphasize that efficiencies must be “merger
specific”—that is, the proponents of the merger must show that the efficiencies could not readily be attained other than by the challenged merger.190 This
element is critical under a general welfare test, where the question is whether
efficiencies serve to justify a merger that actually raises prices. If the same
efficiencies could be generated without the merger, then society could have
the efficiency's social gains without sustaining the merger's welfare losses.
And, one of the best engines for producing efficiencies is competition—a
merger might be a convenient way to achieving cost savings, but often competition will work as well as or better than a merger, while leaving a more
competitive market structure.
But why must efficiencies be merger specific under the Merger Guidelines’ quasi-consumer welfare approach? The Guidelines require both that
the efficiencies be of sufficient magnitude to reverse completely any price
increase, and that the claimed efficiencies be merger specific.191 This approach is perplexing. First, if the efficiencies are not of sufficient magnitude
to offset fully any propensity toward a price increase, then the efficiency defense will be rejected whether or not the claimed efficiencies are merger specific. However, if the efficiencies are in fact of sufficient magnitude to predict that the post-merger price will be no higher than the pre-merger price,
then why do we care? Such a merger does not harm consumers, and as a
190

See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10:
The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another
means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-specific efficiencies. Only alternatives that are practical in the business situation faced by the merging firms
are considered in making this determination. The Agencies do not insist upon a less restrictive
alternative that is merely theoretical.
The Guidelines add in a footnote, id § 10 n.13:
The Agencies will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be attained by
practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or licensing. If a
merger affects not whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved, only the timing
advantage is a merger-specific efficiency.
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 85 (D.D.C. 2015) (stating that claimed
efficiencies are not shown to be merger specific when a substantial amount could be achieved by means
other than merger); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at
*50 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (where the court found that the defendants’ claimed defense that the merger
would provide them with better quality marketing data were both conjectural and not merger specific, but
also concluded that prices would rise); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 90 (D.D.C.
2011) (numerous claimed efficiencies including consolidation of debit card and other financial accounts
neither verifiable or shown to be merger specific); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d
26, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (efficiency claim of increased innovation in the future rejected because it was not
shown to be either verifiable or merger specific).
191 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 4.
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result, is not anticompetitive. Indeed, such a merger appears to be nearly a
pure welfare improvement: it benefits the merging parties by reducing their
costs. It makes consumers no worse off or else benefits them. The likely harm
is to competitors of the post-merger firm, who must now compete against the
merged firm’s reduced costs. In other words, if we consistently apply the
consumer welfare approach that the Merger Guidelines lay out, we should
not care if the efficiencies are merger specific, so long as the predicted postmerger price is no higher than the pre-merger price.
One possible reason for requiring merger specific efficiencies is that, if
the efficiencies are attainable by some means other than a merger, the result
might be lower prices and a consumer benefit via increased competition. In
that case, consumers would be better off if the firm(s) in question attained
their efficiencies by means other than a merger. While that might be factually
true, this approach is difficult to reconcile with a statute that condemns mergers only if they may “substantially lessen” competition, and not merely because they fail to benefit competition as much as some alternative.192
For example, suppose that the government makes out a prima facie case
that a merger will injure consumers by $4 million as a result of higher prices
if efficiencies are ignored. The defendants are able to show an efficiency of
$5 million, however, more than $4 million of which will be passed on. As a
result, consumers are no worse off as a result of the merger. At that point the
merger has been shown not to cause any competitive harm under the Merger
Guidelines’ test, and it should not matter whether the efficiencies are merger
specific. The challenger might say that the efficiencies could be attained by
some other means and that, without the merger, prices would fall even further. But that position is not justified by the language of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which condemns mergers only under a “lessen competition”
standard.193 And, if instead it is shown that post-merger prices will be higher,
then the efficiency defense will be rejected—once again, it does not matter
whether the efficiencies are merger specific.
F.

Efficiencies Relating to Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights

The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines statement on efficiencies include two paragraphs on research, development, and innovation efficiencies:
Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the

192 See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1127–31. This is one reason that both the Agencies and the courts have largely abandoned the “actual potential entrant” doctrine of conglomerate mergers. Under it, a merger was condemned on the theory that if the merger partner had entered the market
de novo the market would have been more competitive, but the merger served to preserve the status quo.
193 Id. ¶ 1128d.
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result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those relating to procurement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be merger-specific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.
When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the
ability of the merged firm to conduct research or development more effectively.
Such efficiencies may spur innovation but not affect short-term pricing. The Agencies also consider the ability of the merged firm to appropriate a greater fraction of
the benefits resulting from its innovations. Licensing and intellectual property conditions may be important to this enquiry, as they affect the ability of a firm to appropriate the benefits of its innovation. Research and development cost savings may
be substantial and yet not be cognizable efficiencies because they are difficult to
verify or result from anticompetitive reductions in innovative activities.194

The Merger Guidelines do not mention whether the inefficiencies in
these cases must apply to both of the merging firms or only one. It is relatively easy to imagine situations where one laggard firm can improve its position by piggybacking on a more effective researcher. But in that scenario,
an efficient firm is not being added to the market; such a merger serves only
to protect an inefficient firm from the competitive process.195
Is it conceivable that two firms, each in a disadvantaged position because of lack of innovation, can overcome their disadvantages through merger? Yes, but it is hard to see a situation in which such a gain would be merger
specific.196 Most obviously, the firms could cross license as an alternative to
merging in order to achieve the same result. Cross license agreements, particularly where they are nonexclusive, can give each firm access to the other’s
technology without necessarily impairing competition between the two firms
at all.197 Cross licensing need not be accompanied by product price fixing and
would likely be unlawful if it did.198 By contrast, after the merger the two
firms could set any joint price they wished.
Research facilities may be a different matter, and could in some cases
resemble production facilities more than research and development as such.
For example, two firms might each have inadequate research facilities that
could profit from being enlarged or modernized. Here, as is the case for production facilities, the merger does not create a single efficient facility, but
rather leaves the resulting firm with two inefficient ones. However, the merger might enable the post-merger firm to specialize its research, just as a merger of production facilities might enable increased plant specialization. If one
facility conducts research of a given type while the other takes the remainder,
194

2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10.
On the requirement that both pre-merger firms be inefficient, see discussion supra, text accompanying notes 101–102.
196 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 975g (which is severely skeptical).
197 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 467–77 (2015)
(noting that cross license agreements only impair competition if they go “beyond the scope”).
198 See id. at 524–29.
195
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each might be able to operate at a more efficient scale and produce positive
net results.
Other efficiency claims relate to larger customer bases for intellectual
property rights, but these should generally be rejected. For example, in
United States v. Oracle Corp.,199 a merger challenge ultimately rejected on
unrelated grounds, the court also rejected the argument that a merger of two
software rivals would give the merged firm a larger customer base over
which to spread the results of its research and development.200 The court did
not reject the argument on principle. Instead, it found inadequate support in
the record.201 Similarly, in Heinz, Heinz claimed that while merger partner
Beech-Nut had an outmoded and inferior production facility, it had superior
baby food recipes.202 The D.C. Circuit found that “recipe consolidation” that
might occur when two producers of baby food merged was not merger specific.203
One problem with arguments about IP sharing is how to limit them.
Combining all of the world's word processing programs, tax programs, recipes, or other competing commercial programs would certainly enlarge the
customer base; right up to the point that one firm controlled 100% of the
market. But one could say the same thing about fast food fried chicken or ice
cream. If one ignores product and service differentiation, IP rights are natural
monopolies. Once the first copy has been created, additional copies cost almost nothing.
Of course, that is where the rub comes in. The reason that all of the
world's software entertainment companies do not jointly produce the same
game is that customers appreciate product variety just as they appreciate
199

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1173–75.
201 Id. at 1775.
202 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
203 Id. at 721–22. As the court observed:
[T]he district court never explained why Heinz could not achieve the kind of efficiencies urged
without merger. As noted, the principal merger benefit asserted for Heinz is the acquisition of
Beech-Nut’s better recipes, which will allegedly make its product more attractive and permit
expanded sales at prices lower than those charged by Beech-Nut, which produces at an inefficient plant. Yet, neither the district court nor the appellees addressed the question whether
Heinz could obtain the benefit of better recipes by investing more money in product development and promotion—say, by an amount less than the amount Heinz would spend to acquire
Beech-Nut. At oral argument, Heinz’s counsel agreed that the taste of Heinz’s products was
not so bad that no amount of money could improve the brand’s consumer appeal. That being
the case, the question is how much Heinz would have to spend to make its product equivalent
to the Beech-Nut product and hence whether Heinz could achieve the efficiencies of merger
without eliminating Beech-Nut as a competitor. The district court, however, undertook no inquiry in this regard. In short, the district court failed to make the kind of factual determinations
necessary to render the appellees’ efficiency defense sufficiently concrete to offset the FTC’s
prima facie showing.
200
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lower cost. It must be remembered that these “enlarged customer base” arguments are to be considered only after a prima facie case of illegality has been
made out against a merger. In most cases, product differentiation preserves
at least imperfect competition. By contrast, a merger unites the two firms into
one. In any event, licensing of IP rights would almost always be an available
alternative, so the claimed efficiency is not merger specific.
In sum, once a prima facie case for a price-increasing merger has been
made out, it is probably best to reject any argument that sharing of intellectual
property rights is efficient because it enlarges the base over which sharing
occurs. The rare exception might arise in relation to standardized products,
like an electronic medical record system, where the interest in product differentiation is very likely not substantial. For example, the St. Luke's decision
considered the merging firms' defense that the merger would permit the postmerger firm to have access to Epic, an electronic medical record system that
St. Luke’s already had, but its merger partner did not.204 The court rejected
the defense, not on principle, but because the claimed efficiency was found
not to be merger specific, and in any event inadequate to counteract the predicted price increases.205 In any event, one wonders why licensing would not
be a superior alternative to merger.
CONCLUSION
Merger analysis today depends more on economic models and simulations than at any time in our history. That development is both good and important, but one must not forget that most judges have only a limited capacity
to address the strengths and weaknesses of technical models. At the same
time, the case law of mergers is descriptively thick and provides many alternative accounts of competition and business choices. This too is a good thing,
because ultimately, the legal analysis has to fit the facts.206 The result that this
creates is what appears to be heavy reliance on models in order to make predictions and also in the expert analysis that goes into preparation for litigation. Once judges listen to testimony and write their opinions, however, the
accounts become descriptively thick and fact specific.
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of merger policy depends on results, rather than any particular combination of analytic models and descriptively rich stories. Although more empirical work needs to be done, what we
204

Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir.

2015).
205

Id. at 791–92.
See e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d, 246
F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (a heavily modeled case in which the court relied mainly on a factually thick
description of the parties’ business strategies, differences in technology, recipes, and distribution practices).
206
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have at this time suggests that current merger policy, if anything, underestimates competitive harm, exaggerates passed-on efficiencies, or produces
some combination of both.
Evidence of efficiencies has rarely succeeded in rebutting an accepted
prima facie case of illegality. As a result, the fault must lie with the prima
facie case, not with the efficiency defense. The defense is, if anything, too
generous to the merging parties. This might call for reconsideration of Judge
Posner's conclusion that the problem of merger-specific proof of efficiencies
is intractable and should be abandoned.207 However, the one thing it does not
do is suggest that we need to lighten the burden once it has shifted to defendants. Not, at least, until there is evidence that many competitively harmless
mergers are being condemned, and that is hardly where we are today.

207

See discussion supra, text accompanying notes 53–54.

